GE Updates #6: 'The Immigration Election' and What Comes Next?
A consensus is forming around reducing immigration: what might happen under the next government and, perhaps most importantly, what might go wrong?
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Last week I wrote about when something will be done in politics beyond rhetoric – specifically, that a real indication of this is when politicians from most or all parties speak in the same general direction on a particular issue. This election, it has become clear that, when it comes to legal immigration, our politicians, like much of the country, think something must be done. But what will this look like?
Historical Background
Immigration is actually a relatively new problem for British politics. While Britain had an empire, it was a country of net emigration, with millions leaving for the colonies, especially, of course, the settler ones – Australia, Canada, South Africa etc. Even while we ‘decolonised’, net migration was still negative, with immigrants only overtaking emigrants in 1979, and then the difference was negligible. Of course, this is not to say immigration was not an issue in politics – Enoch Powell was the most notable of the racists who directed fierce invective at immigrants from the Commonwealth in particular – but population increase as a result of immigration is new.
Since the 1990s, net migration has consistently stayed above 100,000, notably increasing in 2004 when Blair opened the way for free movement for the new countries of the EU, most importantly Poland and Romania. It was after this point, and especially with the 2010 Election, that net migration became a focus of British electoral politics. Famously, David Cameron promised to bring numbers down to the ‘tens of thousands’, and his abject failure to do so was a contributing factor in the Brexit vote. Since 2016, however, immigration has only increased, with numbers doubling and tripling post-Brexit (in part due to Hong Kong and Ukraine) – and it is this that brings us to our present day.
The Positions
Though Labour have made noises about limiting net migration, it has naturally enjoyed (or rather not) a reputation as a pro-immigrant party: from Brown’s ‘bigoted woman’ comment to Corbyn’s internationalism, the party of the 2010s was either, at the least, unsure and uncomfortable on the Tories’ rhetoric and policies on immigration, and at the most ardent critics. This has changed. As pointed out in recent debates, there is a clear gap in rhetoric between Starmer’s ‘changed Labour Party’ and the continuing internationalism of the Greens, SNP and Plaid Cymru, who have defended the levels of net migration, rightly pointing out that Britain’s economy and public services rely on foreign-born people. It’s obvious Labour don’t disagree – but rather they have a problem with this type of economy, one that uses migrant labour to function with low-wages and poor conditions, particularly in social care, and one that allows both businesses and government to ignore industrial strategy. As such, they promise in their manifesto to ‘fire up skills training rather than look overseas to fill skills gaps, and end the days of sectors languishing on the shortage of skills list without a plan to deal with the problem’ and to bring an ‘end to workplace exploitation, where migration is used as a way to undercut the terms and conditions of workers here.’ For Labour, the state can bring immigration down through skills training and intervening in the employment practices of businesses.
The Conservatives represent a different option – a more populist limit on migration. Faced with their failure to control migration numbers having appealed to those voters most upset about current and historical levels, they have now dialled up their proposed solutions. Their ‘points-based system’ has actually increased immigration – levels are double, and were triple, what they were while we were in the EU (ironically, now Eastern Europe’s economies are doing so well, net migration may well have come down on its own had we not left). As such, they aim to set a legally-enforceable decreasing cap – should net migration reach that level with a few months left of the year, presumably no more people would be let in. This is, of course, pretty much unworkable, and would be terrible for both the economy and public services.
And, in a sliding scale of impracticality, Reform are the most radical. They want a ‘one in one out’ policy, with an immediate cap of net migration of zero. Of course, being a smaller party, they can afford to offer incredulous policies.
Looking Forward
These are reasonably divergent approaches. But where there is unity is on skills. It was funny to watch Harriet Harman, former deputy and temporary Labour leader, find herself agreeing with David Bull, Reform Deputy Leader, on The Political Fourcast a couple of weeks ago. The most popular parties are all singing from the same hymn sheet – that a change is needed in our economic model to one that prioritises jobs and training for people already in Britain over importing skilled (and ‘non-skilled’) workers from abroad, whether in sectors like engineering or in obvious areas like social care.
Labour will, of course, form the next government in all likelihood. So, it is reasonable to assume their manifesto pledges will turn into policy, especially because it is ideologically palatable. Rather than a national cap, which is far too reactionary for the Britain’s main party of the left, a skills/training approach plays to traditional (whisper it, but ‘Old Labour’) industrial policy, allowing the party to synthesise its approach to immigration with wages and education. Cross-party consensus and ideological acceptability, therefore, should combine to make this all likely to happen.
Doom and Gloom
But will it work? Industrial strategy is famously difficult and expensive, as the IMF has recently said, and, as the Conservatives have shown, immigration is tough to bring down. Labour would need to successfully remodel the employment models of whole sections of the economy and public services to achieve the desire outcome (lower net migration) – which will be difficult when the party is entering office with a very long to-do list. This is not far off 1940s/60s planning, and considering how that went, and how much weaker state delivery is now, this is, perhaps, unlikely to work on a macro scale.
And immigration has become a toxic issue, especially around so-called ‘illegal’ migrants, but increasingly this is also shifting to those entering the country legally. There is genuine anger among swathes of the electorate – and, importantly, this anger is focused on immigration but is created by dissatisfaction with areas across government – not only employment but housing and other public services, making that system-wide change all the more important, making the next government’s job even harder. Failure in any of these areas, and immigration may well remain both prominent and toxic in the political discourse. Additionally, should the cost of living and the wider economy/public services picture improve, immigration may again rise to one of the top issues guiding voter intention - possibly with even more vitriol than we saw in and around the Brexit vote, given the failure since then to deliver on the lower migration that was voted for.
Additionally, you can guarantee the Conservatives, especially should they elect someone on the right of the party like Kemi Badenoch as leader, will keep the pressure up from opposition – which will only increase if some of the Reform contingent is elected (or even with only one MP – what else would you expect from Farage, the Reform candidate most likely to win his seat?) As the Institute for Fiscal Studies has recently argued, small parties, because of their position on the fringes of government, can afford to promise the world, worsening the health of the political discourse (and one might say our democracy as a result).
Which leads us to two open-ended questions: should Labour’s initial skills-based programme not work, or take too long to work, could we see something more radical? Is the toxic debate on immigration here for the long-haul?
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