State of Play #13: The Union Unleashed
Developments in Scotland and Northern Ireland shifts the political landscape
The nations of the union form the tectonic plates of the UK’s political landscape: holding 117 parliamentary seats between Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland, they regularly determine power in Westminster. It should, accordingly, come as no surprise that the union has a unique ability to both make and destroy British Prime Ministers and politicians.
The Westminster bubble, however, habitually ignores the union – oblivious to the consequences of its mismanagement. Foolish, considering that two Prime Ministers were almost killed by its conflicts (Margaret Thatcher and John Major) and several others brought down, directly or indirectly, by repercussions from its politics (from William Gladstone to Theresa May). For once this blindness might end as both Sunak and Starmer realise their legacies will be intertwined with the devolved nations. Major changes in Scotland and Northern Ireland have possibly shifted the balance of power, with both Westminster leaders trying to capitalise.
Revolution in Scotland
Have we just witnessed the beginnings of a revolution in Scottish politics? Some think so. As Nicola Sturgeon’s 9-year reign comes to end, she leaves: a mixed governing record, an undelivered referendum and, paradoxically, a decade of phenomenal electoral success. It is on this pillar of achievement that Sturgeon will want her legacy to be remembered by, as Blair McDougall states:
“While she was a referendum loser, she was undoubtedly an election winner. Building on the nationalist framing of Scottish politics to win in Holyrood, Sturgeon was also able to exploit a series of too-close-to-call general elections to inject herself into UK debates where the SNP had been, in the past, seen as irrelevant”
The other key pillar of achievement Sturgeon will rightly claim is her successful leadership during Covid – carefully guiding Scotland through lockdowns, while diverging with the London government numerous times. However, the cynic would rightly remind us that most level-headed politicians would have looked somewhat imperious in comparison to the then Prime Minister; Boris Johnson, who struggled with the technicalities and trade-offs of a pandemic so opposed to his core belief in freedom, matched with his revulsion to delivering bad news.
The big question for Sturgeon’s legacy will be whether she missed an opportunity for that ultimate pillar of achievement: a second independence referendum. Against the backdrop of the May and Johnson premierships (2016-2022), when Westminster was tearing itself apart over Brexit (in opposition to the majority of Scottish opinion), there was – possibly – an opportunity for Sturgeon to achieve greatness.
After losing in 2014, there were likely three ‘viable’ routes to further the SNP’s power and cause of independence:
1. Pushing for a referendum legally and making it the centrepiece of the SNP, continuing the strategy of Alex Salmond at the risk of one-dimensional repetition.
2. Pushing for a referendum illegally, as seen in Catalonia, and creating (like Johnson did in 2019 through the unconstitutional prorogation of Parliament) a People Vs Parliament argument, although this time with the edge of Scotland Vs England.
3. A longer-term strategy of building a strong Scottish government, gaining further devolutionary powers from the UK government to a tipping point where voters – more confident after seeing a strong and divergent Scottish state led by Sturgeon in action – would vote ‘yes’ in a second referendum in 10-15 years time.
Sturgeon chose the first option. Ripping up a 300-year-old union is a tough hand to play, but she played it reasonably well – always positioning the party as the de facto independence outlet, while picking up the anti-westminster / establishment vote. Sturgeon has not jeopardised the party, or constitution, through illegal actions as other secessionists have in Catalonian. The result is a strengthened party now experienced in governing, if unclear about its future strategy to achieve independence. But without Sturgeon’s solidification of the SNP’s popularity, it’s quite possible to imagine a world where after the referendum defeat, the party’s vote would have withered. Sturgeon ensured that the previously ‘irrelevant’ SNP became, and remained, a mainstay in UK politics.
By choosing that first option, however, and not switching strategy, the SNP has become the stagnant status quo it so desired to destroy. It has sacrificed governing capability for campaigning gains, more interested in the populist hit of independence than a fleshed out vision of a new Scottish state. Without the short term gain of a second referendum, Sturgeon’s strategy – like Angela Merkel’s Russian gas dependency – could age poorly.
Why is this a revolution?
The real explosive nature of this resignation is its impact on Labour and the Scottish political battleground. Sturgeon acted as an effective dam holding the SNP voter coalition together, and it seems that unless the new leader can reinspire and renew it’s driving vision, it will likely haemorrhage votes to Labour in the next election. Academics and party insiders alike are confident that Labour – without the electoral force of Sturgeon blocking them – can capture around 20+ seats in Scotland. Not since Ed Miliband lost all but one of Labour’s 41 seats in Scotland has Labour even been considered for double digit returns north of Carlisle.
The prospect of 20 new seats, previously not included in Starmer’s calculated route towards No. 10, makes the numbers for a Labour majority demonstrably easier. Analysis like James Kanagasooriam’s on the possibility for Labour to lose in 2024, has become, if not redundant, then severely flawed since Sturgeon’s resignation. Scottish seats, it's fair to say, are simply easier ground for Labour politics – more socially liberal, economically left wing and anti-Tory. Without the established Sturgeon to fight Scotland’s corner, Scottish voters may settle for a strong Labour government grounded in Scottish seats, rather than risk a Tory comeback or tricky SNP-Labour coalition. It’s a testament to Sturgeon’s ability, and detriment to Labour, that the Scottish battleground has been so vacant of red on yellow warfare for so long.
It’s also worth noting that reducing the likelihood (and thus narrative) of a hung parliament will also make the Tories’ top attack lines of a ‘chaos SNP-Labour coalition’ redundant as Labour will actively attack SNP votes and seats.
TPI will be exploring the numbers and dynamics of the 2024 parliament – with a deep dive into wargaming coalitions, alliances, results, intrigue and plots in a new series soon.
Evolution in Northern Ireland
After months of speculation on TPI, and promising murmurs in Westminster, Sunak has successfully negotiated his revised Northern Ireland protocol deal, now branded the ‘Windsor Framework’. The substance of the deal is somewhat significant, but is essentially an evolution, not revolution. Yes, the general easing of trade, increased Northern Ireland alignment with the UK and supposed increased Northern Irish political sovereignty through the new ‘Stormont Break’ are three key wins for Sunak and the UK, however its impacts long term are unknown.
The ambiguity of the Stormont Break means it could be completely irrelevant (simply devolving power from Parliament to Stormont) or monumentally annoying for future EU treaties if Jeffrey Donaldson’s DUP decides to flex its muscles. Under the proposal, the DUP (or any other NI party) will be able to block any changes to EU structure and treaties that are deemed 'substantial’, and not ‘trivial’. The subjectivity of this clause is absurd, leading to numerous interpretations. It is the perfect example of a ‘wait and see’ moment in politics.
The real fascinating revelation is less the deal, which has been on the table for over 2 years, but Sunak’s pivot to attacking the DUP. Mirroring Thatcher's pivot in the 1985 NI Agreement, the UK Government’s ire has focused on the unionists. Sunak has successfully pursued a submarine political strategy by shutting out the excitable DUP (who seem impossible to please), and instead launching straight into serious negotiations with the EU and other NI parties. He has transformed the Brexit game with a simple switch of attention – something May and Johnson failed to do.
The strange tangent link to the DUP is its allies in the Tory party – the infamous ERG. While Sunak is following a similar strategy of Cameron and May in subduing and suppressing this wing of the party, it seems this time the ERG have finally been snookered. Locking in the approval of Steve Baker and Jacob Rees-Mogg (key figureheads in the ERG) is a shift in the internal Tory civil war not seen since Johnson’s capitulation to their demands in October 2019. On the subject of Johnson, his ability to use the chaotic power of the ERG faction and the inertia of the DUP to hurt Sunak’s deal or stop its passage through parliament should now be nullified, even if both eventually oppose the deal.
With the deal secured, and bound to pass parliament through confirmed backing from Labour and the Liberal Democrats, heads turn to the future once again. Can Sunak double up his success by restoring power sharing to Stormont? Installing the first Sinn Fein First Minister in Stormont will prove difficult. If the DUP fully rejects Sunak’s revised protocol deal, it could prove impossible. Worse still, a new Northern Irish election is due if power sharing cannot be restored – with the DUP set to make further losses, and the spectre of the Alliance party getting second place looming.
If Alliance (the only non-sectarian party in Northern Ireland) does get second place in a Northern Irish election, the Good Friday Agreement (GFA) basically breaks – only designed to incorporate unionist and nationalist parties in shared government. On the eve of the 25th Anniversary of the Agreement, Sunak will have to continue his hard graft into a renegotiation of the treaty to incorporate a new settlement for the post-Brexit politics of Northern Ireland. Any deal will inevitably weaken the diminished (but not destroyed) unionist, right-wing movement and would, therefore, be incredibly difficult to get done as it would require dual-community approval. However, an ambitious renovation could be the only option to stop the GFA from dying on its 25th Birthday.
The flip side is Sunak passing his deal, restoring power sharing and (if necessary) successfully amending the GFA to ensure future power sharing stability in Northern Ireland. A triple success few could argue against. Fail on most, and Sunak’s Northern Ireland win could be viewed as a blip of euphoria in a long passage of post-brexit Northern Irish depression.
The New Battleground
What this really all amounts to is a new sense of mystery. For the first time since the 1964 election we have every major party and minor party of note led by a new leader. The revolution of Sturgeon’s resignation in Scotland creates a transformed battleground, and thus an infinitely easier path to a majority for Labour. Northern Ireland is experiencing societal and electoral churn, with its constitutional framework of the GFA pressured by the generational pressures of modern plurality vs sectarianism, with Brexit as the catalyst. Sunak’s continued contribution to this evolution of Northern Irish politics both creates opportunities and dangers, but it is a trade off he seems willing to undertake – as Tony Blair (and John Major to a lesser extent) did 25 years ago.
The stage is set and the starting gun has already been fired for the long election campaign of 2024. While Johnson’s prospects of bringing down Sunak have been blunted, they are not completely impotent. Sunak’s Northern Ireland deal is not implemented yet, nor is it a silver bullet if done so – while Starmer’s new opportunity in Scotland will dampen spirits of Tory recovery. With the union unleashed, the opportunities and ambiguities widen.
