State of Play #18: A Rapid Restart

Analysis of the breakdown within the Number 10 team

The crisis consists precisely in the fact that the old is dying and the new cannot be born; in this interregnum a great variety of morbid symptoms appear.
― Antonio Gramsci

It had quickly become clear that the power dynamics within Number 10 had demonstrably fallen apart – if it had ever worked to begin with. Anthony Seldon, who I regularly work and converse with, has written two insightful pieces, one in The Times and the other in The Guardian. I don’t want to add much more in comment beyond endorsing these columns – partly because I’m increasingly involved in Labour ideas and circles, and thus it would be disingenuous to pretend I’m purely outside of this realm. But also because this substack was never intended to be a hyper-journalistic commentary thread.

The historical ‘eagle eyed’ views of which Peter Hennessy talks of in his classic The Prime Ministers is much closer to my favoured analysis – dipping in every few months to bring a contemporary historical update or record. Many may baulk at conflating history with the contemporary, but these timed-analyses become extremely useful in the longer view of history as references of thinking made in the moment. But the key with these interventions is they must be timed – giving space for substantive developments and fleeting narratives to settle. With that said, the recent events in No.10 require at least a quick swoop to collect some thoughts, particularly as this could (and should) be the last changing of two key roles for the entirety of Labour’s term: the Chief of Staff and the Cabinet Secretary. 

Why did it go wrong?

For those not engrossed in Labour’s Kremlinology, the simple problem consisted of two diverging views of what Keir Starmer needs to be a successful prime minister. Theory one, what I’ll call the ‘pure governing’ strategy, consisted of the idea that the political and electoral minds helping Starmer into government should be phased out for those more adept at running the Whitehall system. Only by doing this, adherents of the theory suggested, could governing progress be made. This theory had become dominant since the announcement in 2023 of Sue Gray (ex-top civil servant) as Chief of Staff.

The other theory, which had lingered since the nadir of Starmer’s leadership after the 2021 Hartlepool by-election loss, was that Starmer’s key issue wasn't his lack of bureaucratic understanding (with those pointing to his time leading the CPS), but that he wasn’t political enough. The ‘political’ theory involved Morgan McSweeney’s promotion to head of election strategy, an individual perceived as Starmer’s political brain. However, there was, evidently, no agreed first principles between these two strategies. 

The recent memory of Liz Truss’s premiership has inspired Starmer’s in more ways than one, but an overlooked aspect is the role of Chief of Staff. Under Truss it was assumed by Mark Fullbrook, a well-respected election strategist who had run her leadership campaign. His performance in this role was roundly criticised – assumed to be too political and not equipped to run a government. After Fullbrook’s poor performance, Labour’s top minds turned to this worry of the overly-political government – already a recognised flaw of Boris Johnson’s No.10 teams.

Avoiding the mistakes of recent governing inexperience historically chimed with Labour’s institutional memory of Tony Blair’s transition to government. The 1990s strategy consisted of hiring Jonathan Powell (ex-Foreign office civil servant) as Chief of Staff. After winning the 1997 election, the more political / electoral minds were lightly phased out, such as Philip Gould, Deborah Mattinson, and to a lesser extent Peter Mandelson. There was essentially an attempt to build a ‘Chinese Wall’ between the electoral and the governing (whether this manifested in government is a different question). But the transition only worked because of the familial level of trust between the New Labour team – a phasing out was not interpreted as the end of access or collaboration.

Mattinson, who had returned to aid Starmer’s electoral strategy for two years, had followed the same pattern – leaving to work on the US election as Labour entered power. The only problem was Starmer’s political brain – McSweeney, was seen by some insiders as too political for a big role, especially one as all encompassing (and semi-constitutional) as the Chief of Staff. Evidently annoyed at his marginalisation, McSweeney and Gray went to war over their theories of how to run Starmer’s government – and there was only to be one winner. What became a personal fissure had really been a fundamental strategic division of how best to supplement Starmer’s weaknesses.

The issue with the ‘governing’ theory is that while Powell joined Blair’s team in 1995, a full two years before the transition to power, Gray joined the team just eight months before. While Powell had time to gain the trust within the team, and also input on a joined up political-governing strategy, Gray did not (at least to the same extent). Powell also had his political blindspots supplemented by Mandelson and Alastair Campbell. While their opinions differed they never bubbled to the surface. Trust was a given. 

McSweeney has had a monopoly over Starmer’s politics since day one of his leadership. Whatever really happened between Gray and McSweeney had obviously subverted this rule – and simultaneously alienated most top aides in the leader’s team who naturally subscribed to McSweeney’s long march rather than Gray’s recent accession. Her political mistakes made in government exacerbated, but did not create, this underlying strategic split. What resulted was three months of governing drift, the natural conclusion when responsibility and authority remain ambiguous.

Claiming Political Legitimacy

Another point worth noting are the dynamics within a political team after victory. One obvious development in recent politics we can note is the ‘decentralisation’ of political teams – tangentially similar to the recent breakdowns in collective responsibility in cabinet government. Which individual claims the success over an election victory is significant to the political capital that results from it. Counter-claims over success in politics always leads to someone resigning – the most recent was Dominic Cummings who claimed to be the architect of the 2019 victory, much to Johnson’s egotistical distaste. As a source close to Cummings told Seldon and I (Johnson at 10): 

Cummings was experiencing mixed emotions. One moment he was giddy about his plans coming to fruition, his second victory in a national poll of historic consequence [...]. The next moment he had a premonition of his disillusioned self, ‘The PM won’t need us any more, now we’ve won. Carrie will try and push us out,’ he confided to a close ally.

I suspect, though this is more speculative, that a very similar dynamic occurred for Labour – and that the low vote share made the contest over who owns the electoral ‘success’ all the more knotty. Gray and the pure governing school interpreted it as a moment to sideline the politics, while McSweeney, the supposed electoral ‘architect’, saw it as the beginning of a new political strategy. On paper the Gray appointment seemed sensible, but in practice Labour’s top players became stuck between two approaches. How Labour convinced itself that the realms of governing and politics were somehow separate is a perplexing question for the history books. However, the descent into infighting and messy briefing is a world that the party must quickly leave in the past.

Politics and Governing.

The focus must now turn to the role of Cabinet Secretary – nailing this hire and ideally splitting it into two roles would go a long way to fixing internal Whitehall / Cabinet Office issues. However,  if Stephen Bush is to be believed, it is unlikely to happen with insiders motivated to not change the wiring of government since Rishi Sunak’s restructure. With this rapid restart, and McSweeney’s energetic briefings, this logic may have changed. But If there is to be no reform of the ruling structures, then recruitment of governing heavyweights who (this time) subscribe and acquiesce to the political authority / strategy of No.10 is vital. Andy Haldane is the obvious place to start, and so is the re-empowerment of John Bew. If the political and the governing are to merge, these types of hires are simply necessary. 

It will become quite clear over the next two budgets, and in the aftermath of next year's May elections, if this new political dynamic of No.10 can actually govern in the face of electoral and global challenges. While much of the briefing has been about the supposed governing naivety of McSweeney, Jill Cuthbertson, Vidhya Alakeson, James Lyons and the new PPS Nin Pandit, it would be a categorical mistake to rule out the potential and power of this No.10 team. But nor is it a given that this new structure will work.

Tom Egerton is a political writer and researcher, his new book The Conservative Effect, co-edited with Anthony Seldon and published by Cambridge is OUT NOW, you can order it here: with Cambridge, Waterstones or Amazon. Follow Tom on X / Twitter here.