The Battle for the Soul of the Liberal Democrats
Analysis of the strategic and ideological divisions playing out within the Lib Dems
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Every Liberal Democrat party leader must cautiously walk a tightrope between the two main parties. Lean too far one way, say on Europe, and one might fall, as Jo Swinson did in 2019. Lean too much the other, as with Nick Clegg in his co-adopted Austerity policies, and catastrophe lies beneath. Arguably, however, neither of these two policies in themselves caused their downfall. Austerity and revoking Article 50 are useful signposts of failures and were to varying degrees toxic, but they are symptomatic of underlying strategic failures. For too long the Liberal Democrats have failed to construct an ‘end game’ or ‘exit strategy’ from the electoral and governing positions they’ve found themselves in. In some ways the party deserves huge credit for having been in a position that requires contemplating power and tackling their long-term electoral health – rather than just a natural tendency to ‘survive’ as the third / fourth party in an inherently unfair First past the post (FPTP). But to finally answer these questions of power the party must plant a political flag to which its members and voters can rally to.
Under Ed Davey’s leadership, aided by key senior figures in Lib Dem HQ, the party is on a road back to the questions it has yet to resolve since its exit from power in 2015. Namely: what, if and when we regain power, do we stand for as a governing party? What, as a liberal, do we believe government should do and what it should not do? Some within the ranks of the Lib Dems want that question answered soon, if not now. Others sympathetic to the leadership instead favour a ‘don’t rock the boat’ strategy, choosing to tackle these questions in the next parliament and favouring a recovery to a twenty-to-thirty seat total. The division opening within the Liberal Democrats is arguably its most intriguing ideological debate since the merger between the SDP and Liberals in 1988. Add the spice of potential power in 2024 and it could become explosive. This piece examines this division and explores the battle for the soul of the Liberal Democrats over the coming years.
A Note on the past
The Lib Dem position is undeniably unique. How does a party recently in government with the Conservatives tack direction and fight the Conservatives’ record while not trashing their own achievements? A party with little governing experience can ill-afford to ask the electorate to elect them (possibly into government) while simultaneously saying ‘ahh look, you know these policies we did in government, yeah they were all rubbish but definitely trust us with your vote’. Many decisions and policy positions we find ourselves in were heavily influenced by the 2010-15 government – for good and bad. Knowing what to lean into from the coalition period and what to avert from is the challenge Davey and senior Lib Dems are tackling.
One easy part to lean on is Davey’s experience: his inherent steady-handedness ‘been there before’ approach is a vote-winner, not loser. Certain policy achievements, whether on same-sex marriage, pensions, or stopping the ‘extreme’ policies of the Conservatives can also be leant into. That is where the list arguably stops. But why? Surely the Lib Dems gained appreciation for the normal governing-party reward of leadership and economic competency, two elements which feed into key electoral winning metrics. As many in European politics will tell you, the junior coalition partner can very rarely ‘own’ these core electoral fruits. But the Lib Dems partly caused their own downfall when they opted for the strategy of ‘breadth’ (junior ministers over several departments with less power) vs ‘depth’ (owning one / two strong spending / ‘great office’ departments with power to enact serious reform). What this, in reality, stemmed from (as with the failure of the Alternative Vote referendum and HoL reform) was a disregard for the long-term path for the coalition – there was no differentiation strategy built in nor appreciation for political pain felt in the mid-terms of government.
This fundamentally comes back to the question: you cannot build a viable exit out of a tricky coalition if you do not know what your party is fundamentally for. If a party goes from ‘compromise’ in coalition to ‘core roots’ outside it, it must have well-defined roots because the voter is being asked to vote against the government you have just helped enact for five years. The other deep-lying question was could the party ever safely exit a coalition which many of its voters and members vehemently disagreed with? Without the ideological definition, certainly not clear to the leadership at the time, the risk of sleepwalking into electoral disaster was higher, and the chance of the party waking up in time was minimal. Fundamentally, without a coherent vision for your party you cannot craft a coherent political strategy.
Campaigning or Governing?
The strategic lessons of the coalition years have not been lost on the Lib Dem leadership. The institutional memory of many involved remains, and several figures understand the mistakes made. As a result, the campaigning edge of the Liberal Democrats has been revived. The idea, popular at the peak of Clegg’s leadership, of ‘air war’ strategy has been ditched for traditional ‘ground war’ hands-on campaigning. Rennardism (named after the Lib Dems’ famous electoral strategist Chris Rennard) is the strategy firmly back in control – one which maximises electoral gain over anything else. This has incited much backlash in certain Lib Dem circles, especially with regard to NIMBY vs YIMBY campaigning. Many Lib Dems have continued their historic role of appealing to certain local needs or wishes to win votes without regard for a coherent national policy. One side effect could be an ideologically divided 2024 MP intake. But this ‘ideological ambiguity’, inherent in Rennardism, is very powerful in fostering electoral gains, and was the core reason for the Lib Dems' peak total of 62 seats in 2005. This strategy focuses all attention on an efficient campaign as insiders continue to tell me, as they told Freddie Hayward in January 2023:
‘Instead of scaling back after the 2019 general election, they [LDHQ] doubled down. Money was used to hire extra campaign staff. The digital, fundraising and campaign teams worked more closely together. The number of campaign managers rose from five to 30. “We have the largest network of field campaign staff in the first half of this parliament going as far back as I can remember,” one senior source involved in the party’s election strategy told me.’
It must also be said the party’s finances are very healthy and generally in a strong position heading into the 2024 election after successive by-election victories. However, the key concern for some now is whether the party has tied themselves into a electoral-governing knot once again. When looking at the distribution of seats the Lib Dems either hold or are second place in (and thus best positioned to win) they are demographically homogenised, meaning messaging and policy platforms can be similar in most seats. The flip side is that many of these seats, known in large part as ‘the blue wall’ are not exactly left-leaning YIMBY on economic policy or housing / infrastructure projects. They were, mostly, part of David Cameron’s electoral coalition in 2010 and 2015. The realignment away from the Tories is significant but hardly revolutionary considering the last few years of chaotic governing and the Lib Dems’ policies of caution and ambiguity – techniques conducive to gaining slightly fiscally conservative seats. Short term political gain is once again being prioritised over vision and long-term political strategy. This will only store up problems if the Lib Dems return to a government and are forced to make difficult trade-offs against their restrictive electoral coalition, especially if the intake is divided over local and regional issues – so obviously demonstrated in divisive national projects like HS2.
Even after the successful by-elections the mood I picked up among many Lib Dem figures is one of restrictive pessimism, as it was eight months ago:
‘Even with a more substantial ground operation, the Lib Dems’ electoral fortunes are inevitably bound up with the performance of the other parties. Ultimately, as the party leadership recognises, their chances may depend less on Lib Dem success than on continual Tory failure.’
No one is arguing the Lib Dems’ position is easy – it's not. Their place in the political system is naturally reactive and heavily constrained. Some would argue Davey is having to hold an intrinsically divided party together, between ‘Social Liberals’ and ‘Classical Liberals’, something that the Dutch Liberals do not have with both liberal wings split between the social D66 and the classical VVD as proportional representation allows them to compete. But the Lib Dems cannot continually languish in the pain produced by FPTP, instead the party should look to forge a new path within it based on a strategic vision.
As
’I don’t think I’m saying “I don’t know what they stand for” because I don’t like their current schtick. It’s because I genuinely can’t answer the question: What is the LibDems’ equivalent [of Labour’s] mission?
And I don’t think you can answer it either. Because there isn’t really one.
At the most abstracted level, political parties are undergirded by shared values. Labour likes redistribution, the Tories like free markets. The LibDems are liberals who like equality, and human rights and so on. Great.
The ‘mission’ then is the strategic bridge that connects the two: The bit where a party sets out its desired outcomes. A translation of the party’s foundational values into what the party actually wants to achieve. And it is important for both campaigning and governing.’
The strategic bridge is non-existent, and certain Lib Dems within the party are deeply worried about the leadership’s inactivity in building one. With a national picture of fighting the still very fiscally conservative Conservatives, it seems the opportunity of re-defining the Lib Dems’ core electoral and governing Liberal mission is being lost. Missed opportunities in politics can quickly become bottled-up problems for another day. If 2024 does, for whatever reason, become a hung parliament, the Lib Dems will be the key player. The same for 2029 if Labour mirrors 1945: a one-term(ish), productive but electorally unviable government (due to hard choices). Defining against Conservative failure will be electorally successful but is a passive choice. How do the Lib Dems define themselves against a Labour party back in power? What, if it did enter a coalition to stop a Tory government, would it manage to agree to the substantive national policy required to rebuild a country burned by recent failures? Where would it be different to Labour? For now these questions are unanswered.
Some, though, are beginning on a journey to answer them – whether with or without the leadership’s support. The 2020 Lib Dem leadership runner-up Layla Moran remains the key magnet for the ‘social liberal’ definition. Her campaign in 2020 was certainly ‘left of centre’ and included young up-and-coming Lib Dem staffers who have since moved to do different roles but still espouse a more left-leaning, YIMBY vision of a national-government approach mixed with classic Liberal rights-protection / freedom of the individual. The next intake of Lib Dem MPs will have more left-leaning post-coalition thinkers ready to shift the balance of a party still confused about its past. At Conference, the forces disillusioned with Davey’s leadership will strategise in different groupings and factions, but their main aim is starting to become clear: at what point is do we move to push for a more ‘left’ leaning leader, strategy or senior figures who are prepared to argue for a Lib Dem vision of government? These thoughts are becoming more prevalent with important thinkers and players within the Lib Dems. The forces are gathering.
It's important to iterate that none in the Lib Dems want a civil war, especially heading into an election year. But some are beginning to lay the arguments of a post-2024 election leadership battle over the soul of the party. The leadership, focused on sensible recovery, has little appetite, and in their view time, to tackle these problems before 2024, and possibly even in the next parliament. If Davey is seen to be faltering – as some individuals in the party argue they are, with just an 11% average in the polls – moves could be made. The battle could start soon, with many senior Lib Dems underrating the chances of an open debate over the party’s true direction post-2024. The form and methods of where possible pressure or rebellion comes from is still under consideration. Where the party will eventually end up is unknown, and arguably relies on how well Davey’s strategy of Rennardism does, and what parliament we find ourselves in after 2024. It's also unclear if Davey’s Rennardism will continue to block the ability for the party to answer its fundamental questions of purpose, and thus exit strategy from coalition, or instead evolve to tackle these questions. One thing is certain: the mistakes of 2010-15 cannot be repeated again.
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