Consensus and Power #3: Surface Politics (REDUX)
How does power translate into everyday politics?
Catch up on the previous piece here
The following is a REDUX piece on Consensus theory and a specific interpretation of it. The views shared are open thoughts / musings and not stubborn conclusions or beliefs. This was republished with a few small edits and title changes on 16/07/24.
Now, back into the real world; the surface and the end of our analogy. After exploring the powerful tides and undercurrents, it may seem as if the surface is a meaningless mirror of already predetermined events. While the path-dependency style analysis of this series reduces the importance of surface action, there are still personal decisions or small moments that change history. Better still, the surface is tough, and brutal – the arena of true politics. Intrigue is the currency; filled with political gossip, plotting, deal-making and backstabbing. The small things are important, even if they do not always transform the deeper forces that power our world.
The three elements of surface politics include are: political capital: the independence and freedom a politician / advisor has to make decisions, people: the quality and cohesion of people in a leader’s team and luck: the mostly uncontrollable events that help or hinder politicians.
All three elements of surface politics link with the corresponding undercurrents discussed in the previous piece. Political capital is replenished by the electorate through victories. People and the quality of individuals in politics is determined by the ideas and makeup of (and recruitment into) the elite. Luck (or lack thereof) can be determined by international events / influences – a war, a natural disaster, or energy supply, for example.
As always, the tides determine the undercurrents which feed into the surface. But is it right to write off the impact of surface changes on our political system entirely? To understand this one must examine the dirty, Machiavellian intrigue of surface politics.
Example: David Cameron’s resignation
Picking up from the last piece, TPI explained the forces that created the 2016 Brexit vote, following the tide and undercurrents. The undercurrents caused a surface change – namely the resignation of the Prime Minister David Cameron. However, while undercurrents will ensure ‘something’ political will happen, exactly how that manifests itself on the surface is not clear, or measurable. The resignation of Cameron was a logical, expected, reaction to Remain losing, considering he was clearly the figurehead of the campaign – much to the detriment of the Remain cause. What occurred after Cameron’s resignation is hardly explicable by complex cycles or undercurrents – instead it was simple politics of people, luck and political capital.
While the surface of politics absorbs the changes of the undercurrents and tides, it is truly ruled by people and their ability to make decisions. All individuals in politics have one common component: they are human(ish) and thus emotional. Emotions can, and do, run high – with dramatic consequences that no cycle, theory or model can predict. This is when change occurs exclusively on the surface: because they have no connection to the deeper forces in politics (or because the ground on which everything stands is so chaotic that powerful agency is the only thing that can interpret change and steady the foundations). A fleeting emotion of a leader or a careless political advisor can switch the momentum of events and history in an instant.
So, continuing the example; the undercurrents destroyed Cameron’s premiership. However, this did not (as most expected it would) translate to the Vote Leave leaders Boris Johnson or Michael Gove becoming PM in 2016. Instead, surface politics ensured a different outcome. Tim Shipman’s account from his classic All Out War paints a picture of human mistakes, luck and emotion changing the fate of UK politics.
NB Context: to become Prime Minister in 2016, Johnson needed to solidify an alliance between the leading Brexiteer leaders of Gove and Andrea Leadsom. To seal the deal with Leadsom (and thus Gove), all Johnson had to do was to remember to announce their alliance in a tweet at 8:00pm that evening. What followed is the biggest surface change fuck up of the last 50 years in British politics:
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Johnson texted Gove, who was also at the Hurlingham event, at 8:10pm to say ‘Andrea wants me to tweet something like “looking forward to the campaign launch tomorrow with top team Michael Gove and Andrea Leadsom” Is that OK? Gove did not reply, but his allies say it was already too late, as Leadsom’s 8pm deadline had been missed. But it seems clear from the subsequent course of events that the situation could have been salvaged if the tweet was sent at that point. It was another hour and eighteen minutes before Leadsom told Johnson she regarded their deal void.
Johnson and his team’s mistake created a crisis in confidence of his ability, leading to his ally Gove to backstab him:
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Gove explained his ‘governing view’ of the past week: ‘Boris has had a week to prove he can be prime minister – not that I was setting out to test him – and in the last twenty-four hours he’s had the opportunity to do two things which were relatively trivial to nail it down. He couldn’t even do those. I don’t have the luxury of time. Tomorrow, I have to say to my colleagues and the country, “I think this man is ready to be prime minister”, and be held to account forever for having made that claim – or not’.
As Shipman notes, Johnson, Gove and Leadsom all had emotional reactions that were a mix of irrational anger or stupid mistakes – which could have been resolved:
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The most interesting question is what would have happened if Gove had not decided to pull the plug, if he had confronted Johnson and made clear things needed to change, if he had even talked Leadsom into attending the launch [of Johnson's leadership] by his side as Chancellor or chief Brexit negotiator.
It was unlucky that Johnson’s supposed allies reacted so forcefully, but the root of the disaster lies also with his and his team’s failure to get the tweet sent. Solidifying premiership-making alliances should not be carelessly treated. The small things matter. After Gove and Leadsom’s ‘betrayals’, Johnson’s reputation and momentum was destroyed. He simply did not have the political capital to continue his campaign, and subsequently dropped out – saving what he had left for another day.
The course of British political history, if this account is to be believed, was changed on a simple mistake. Theresa May then became Prime Minister, who failed to unite the Brexiteers which resulted in three wasted years. When Johnson eventually got to Downing Street, it was arguably at the wrong time. Johnson was a Prime Minister designed for the war of Brexit, not the technical grittiness of the post-Brexit peace. Without this simple mistake, his record in politics may have been very different, though knowing his character it is unlikely.
Political Capital
The most complex part of surface politics is the elusive term ‘political capital’, seemingly bandied about by journalists and politicos without much thought for its source or explanation. Essentially, it's an easy way to measure a politician’s power to do something. If a politician has high political capital, they may be able to take bolder decisions – such as firing an unwanted minister or pursuing innovative but controversial legislation. If a politician has low political capital, they have very little ability to do, well, anything. Rishi Sunak is plagued with minimal political capital due to the position he has inherited from his fatigued governing party – seen in his retreat from a 100 MP rebellion on housing reform.
Political capital should be viewed like money.
Politicians get a certain amount of money (worth) based on their skill, team, connections and timing of when / how they inherit the crown. The media also act as a constraint or replenisher of political capital – the advertisers / marketing team of the political world. But the key source of political capital is elections – essentially their salary, with the people as the main employer. Rather than a yearly salary, elected politicians in the UK get theirs every 4-5 years. Without accomplishments and performance in office its rare politicians get rewarded with a healthy political capital salary at elections. However, politicians can earn political capital in office – like bonuses. Whether by taking advantage of crises, achieving progress on their mission for government or marshalling a growing / stable economy. But getting a bonus, on top of your salary, is not regular in politics. Incumbent leaders usually lose political capital during the middle of their terms – mostly through small scale elections (By-elections and Local elections). This is comparable to paying taxes for being in power. The people both give and take.
The political life of politicians and advisors is short lived mostly because of that ever-depleting pool of political capital. Big election wins are the only large replenishment of power most leaders get. Election victories only get smaller and harder – translating into smaller and smaller replenishments of political capital, until a leader runs out and is simply ousted in a coup or loses an election.
A leader may have brilliant control over their rivals / internal party factions – but even the best leaders can only play others off each other for so long. The Labour prime minister Harold Wilson was a master of this, winning four elections and remaining party leader for thirteen years. He played off the right and left wings of his party to near perfection, even if it harmed his governing agenda. Margaret Thatcher and Tony Blair were also brilliant at maintaining their political capital – mostly through large election victories and reform. But even they could barely get beyond a decade.
Time, however, is not always the main cause of losing political capital. Getting big decisions wrong or losing key members of your team (who maintained / earned you political capital) is also important. Blair’s Iraq War, Thatcher’s poll tax / EU policy, Anthony Eden’s Suez crisis, Cameron’s EU referendum, James Callaghan’s Winter of Discontent and John Major’s ERM black Wednesday crash are all glaringly obvious mistakes that shortened (or immediately ended) their premierships. Their political capital was destroyed after each of these events.
Big wins (important legislation, successful wars / interventions, economic growth) are harder to quantify in terms of political capital. Winston Churchill won World War Two but was promptly booted out and lost significant amounts of political capital in the process. The same can be said for Edward Heath’s decision to join the EEC – bringing huge economic benefits to the country, but hardly rewarding Heath who lost the 1974 election. This is because wins do not always immediately translate into a gain of political capital, as their effects are lagging or nonlinear on the public (who are normal humans!). Surviving in office can be a key source of further political capital as politicians reap the rewards of slow progress (economic renewal, reforms translating to success, better global conditions or strong responses to lucky events). It is thus that mystic and intangible source of political capital that every politician craves, but few ever amass enough of to become historic figures.
People
Building networks and recruiting the best people is key to an effective political team. Leaders and power players must be able to build effective political teams, creating networks and recruiting people with unique abilities and strong links to other powerful elites. But without cohesion and efficient people management within a team, even the greatest minds will fail to pull together to deliver successful political change or win campaigns.
As, Dominic Cummings states (Square brackets are TPI’s insertions):
Politics is always a mix of a) deep forces that are hard to quantify or affect [Tides and undercurrents] and b) short-term decisions of people to focus on a project (like an election) [surface politics] that are highly nonlinear. Campaigns are dynamic, you never really know what will happen until you see people under serious pressure.
It’s also why Cummings references Colonel Boyd’s mantra: “People, ideas, machines — in that order!” For Cummings, if the deeper forces of the tides and the undercurrents are inevitable, there is no point attempting to quantify them. The best thing political actors can do is build a team to interpret the power of the deeper forces in our system, using them as best they can for their desired change. As argued in the last piece, changing the political groupthink of elites in Westminster requires pushing the wall of the status quo (which will naturally suppress change). Ensuring a political team is of the highest quality and can work cohesively under pressure is paramount – without ensuring these factors forging change is impossible.
In recent history, the better No.10 teams have created better premierships. Margaret Thatcher had Charles Powell (Advisor) and Bernard Ingham (Comms director), while Tony Blair had Jonathan Powell (Chief of Staff) and Alastair Campbell (Comms director). Not only were these advisors brilliant at their roles – ensuring streamlined strategy, structure and operations – but they were completely trusted by their leaders. A high-quality team is useless if a political leader cannot delegate or trust their team.
Put simply: a leader must control their egos. Knowing when to back down and get behind your team is the most underrated quality in a leader. Clement Attlee was the PM who understood this the most, utilising phenomenal ministerial teams to achieve fundamental change. Johnson, after losing his first team in 2020, failed to listen to any of his future teams – while also ensuring that when he did allow their input they were only going to give him the advice he wanted to hear. Surrounding oneself with yes-men / women is also a fatal way for a leader to construct a team. (For more, see Johnson at 10)
Luck
The final, and most abnormal, part of surface politics is just pure luck. ‘Events dear boy, events’ as Harold Macmillan supposedly, but never actually, said. The luck of events encompasses anything from the international to the domestic. Luck always relies on an element of the random – uncontrollable by politicians / advisors / other elites. Ranging from natural disasters to inherited economic positioning – luck is a large factor in determining the political power (capital) of a leader or the result of an election.
Margaret Thatcher winning the 1982 Falklands war was a lucky break which transformed her position from dire straits to a 1983 landslide (though it must be noted economic recovery was beginning). The luck of Tony Blair inheriting a good economy, repaired by Major after his 1993 ERM mistake. The luck, as referenced earlier, of May inheriting the crown after Gove stabbed Johnson in 2016. Luck both creates and destroys leaders.
You can, however, make your own luck. If a leader (Johnson – see SOP#7) puts themselves in a position where they expose themselves through corruption, moral abhorrence or scandal then it’s not really a simple lack of ‘luck’ when said stories come to light. The same can be said for the war in Ukraine. Yes, the event itself is having an ‘unlucky’ effect on our inflation (the Conservative’s party main defence), but the UK’s failed energy policy has ensured the negative effects of this luck – namely previous governments not building energy infrastructure or independence. Insulating and positioning a country towards independence, and away from interdependence, is an effective shield against luck turning against you.
Some would argue, though, that in a modern globalized world this is impossible – evident with pandemics like Covid-19. Whether you were the hyper-prepared Singapore or the unprepared United Kingdom, negative effects of lockdown (mainly economic) were an ‘unlucky’ inevitable trade-off. Although, preparation does somewhat translate into a higher degree of independence. As always, it’s a balance. Luck is both made and randomly attained. The true sign of a leading political player is to ride the bad and good luck to near-perfection; never letting a bad-moment go to waste nor a good development blind them..
To Conclude
So why focus on surface politics? Well, stealing Walter Bagehot’s phrase (1867): “it’s the buckle that fastens.” A link from the unquantifiable and almost mystical undercurrents and tides to the reality of the political game. It is the means which results in the ends. However, as argued throughout this piece, the political surface itself creates change.
It’s for this very reason that the surface matters. Ensuring your political team is cohesive and brilliant is not a bonus to politics, but a fundamental. Managing and upkeeping your political capital – a mix of safe moves and bold progress – ensures political longevity. Strategically positioning the country in a way that it can respond or insulate itself from unlucky disasters, while also making the most of fortuitous events, rewards political leaders with political capital.
These reasons explain how the tides and undercurrents reach the surface – through political graft. This graft is difficult and all consuming, and most politicians are horrifically bad at it. There are a set few who make it – but when they do so – they do so not just with the benefits of the tides and undercurrents converging, but the simplicity of the surface to match. A harmony of all factors.
This series, then, justifies why “All political lives, unless they are cut off in midstream at a happy juncture, end in failure, because that is the nature of politics and of human affairs” (Enoch Powell, 1977). Politics is hard. Politics is complex. Politics is finite. This is simply because politics incorporates and determines everything in life.
An incredibly fascinating read. Highly interesting and provided a captivating insight into surface politics.. All in all, it was a pleasure to read.