State of Play #11: Year in Review (2022)
A political diagnosis of 2022
It’s a lazy trope to start a political yearly review by using the phrase ‘we are living in unprecedented times’. It’s even lazier, and even more common, to then explain why it’s a lazy term but still use it. Has anyone actually thought about what ‘unprecedented’ means? What can truly be defined as ‘unprecedented’ politics in an age where limits on power and political precedents are constantly being pushed? Explaining the politics of 2022 cannot simply be done through, or compared to, previous examples.
Precedent can be vaguely translated as the ‘normal’ thing, the ‘usual’ political way of doing something, and is similar to other lofty political words like ‘norms’ and ‘conventions’. But the beautiful thing about UK political life is its fluidity – never standing still while still retaining a tangible link to the past.
George Orwell once said: “What can the England of 1940 have in common with the England of 1840? But then, what have you in common with the child of five whose photograph your mother keeps on the mantelpiece? Nothing, except that you happen to be the same person.”
What is the same about the country in 2022 and 1922? Nothing, except they are the same country. Do we really share the same precedents 100 years on, or is this a myth we construct to find some connection to our country and solidity in our history?
It was not a precedent in 1922 for women to vote, for Prime Ministers to be democratically elected within their parties, nor for digital technology to enable the government's every message and decision. Nations and politics can obviously be compared in fascinatingly useful ways throughout history (as TPI always does). However, relying on vague precedents is a reflection that instead reveals a desire for explanation and structure in our current times, and is not a worthwhile exploration into historical firsts or unknowns.
Even if some parts of 2022 are supposedly ‘unprecedented’, what help will that definition give other than more confusion and fear of the unknown? A better way to review this political year is to identify and debate the causes of political chaos, rather than powerlessly protest at how ‘unprecedented’ it was.
2022 - A diagnosis
Ukraine and Zelenskyy
February 2022 is when political chaos truly took hold, although it had been building below the surface for a while. The end of the Cold War (1991) had brought the naive belief in the West that Liberal idealism (the idea that everyone should just get along) / democracy would be spread through capitalism and guns. Whether in China, Iraq, Russia or Afghanistan, everyone would be liberal and accepting of the US’ dominance in our world system. Immediately this faltered, with China diverging with a strong economy, Russia continuing to remain a power with large energy supplies and Iraq and Afghanistan eventually refusing liberalism at gunpoint. The world had shifted to a realist, anti-liberal perspective, as the time of western dominance ended (1991-2012). History did not end.
NATO and the EU, two different but overlapping alliances, forgot to wake up to this new mindset. Their continued expansion of their ‘sphere of influence’ (countries they control geopolitically) further into ex-Soviet territory, accepting the applications of borderland states like the Baltics. Ukraine and Georgia began to be involved in potential expansion in the 2000s and, while they had every right to do so as sovereign states (as with other former-Soviet states), NATO and the EU failed to formulate responses to possible Russian anger at NATO on their doorstep - and Russia invaded both in 2008 and 2014 respectively. Nor did they help Ukraine (notoriously corrupt at this point) to securely become a liberal western state – if it ever could become so.
After the 2014 Crimean invasion, many believed NATO and the West would respond to Russia’s heightened aggression in weakening the possible NATO / EU member of Ukraine – or, at the very least, ensure Ukrainian neutrality for a fraught borderland state. Instead, the West faltered and allowed several years of failed diplomacy with Russia and minimal meaningful cooperation with Ukraine, while still maintaining a wish to bring Ukraine ever closer.
After several months of obvious build-up from late 2021 to early 2022, Russia invaded. Partly led by, for once, the UK, the West rallied around an unproven Ukrainian state. The Battle of Kyiv was won by the beginning of April, as Zelenskyy proved himself with the now notorious line ‘I need ammo not a ride’. Ukraine has since counter-attacked, retaking Kharkiv by May and Kherson by November, which has now brought the conflict into a strange state of dynamic equilibrium.The spectre of nuclear weapons remains, however. One can’t help ponder the notorious statement of Charles Tilly (1975): “War made the state, and the state made war”, with this conflict unifying and reinvigorating a once politically divided and (reasonably) corrupt state.
It seems that in 2022, the person who most embodied the image and passions of the West was an ex-comedian born in the USSR.
Boris Johnson - SOP#7
The downfall of our first Prime Minister begins and ends with Boris Johnson. His downfall was inevitable - he was unable to create a team, stick to a mission for reform and avoid catastrophic scandals. There was not much depth to his destruction, even if Covid worsened ideological divisions in his party and the Ukrainian war created harsher economic conditions for his government. Johnson as a PM achieved some highs: a landslide election (2019) and passing a Brexit deal, efficient vaccinations and helping the defence of Ukraine, matched with significant lows: lack of progress on policy, waging war against the state (Civil Service, Judges, Parliament) for no calculated outcome and morally degrading the office of PM through the triple P of scandals (Paterson, Partygate and Pincher). It’s hard to conceive the UK will ever have another leader that knowingly breaks the law and willingly promotes sexual assaulters to positions of power.
One conclusion is certain of this episode of political chaos: Johnson’s downfall was self-inflicted.
Economic Decline - SOP#8
The age of low inflation and cheap government borrowing – which translates to free money – is over. A myriad of crises: long decline of UK productivity / inequality, Covid side effects, the effects of leaving the bountiful EU markets and Ukraine-incited high inflation has deeply scarred the UK economy. When inflation bites, and inequality worsens, strikes usually follow – whether in the 1920s or 1970s. When the connection between employer and worker breaks down, civil society’s defence mechanism is to strike, a preventative measure before further breakdown in society and conflict. The UK’s inability to fundamentally forge new economic reform and progress (not reliant on hyper-globalisation) for the last 12 - 25 years has left it weaker, more open to ‘unlucky’ global economic downturns (See PE#4). The source of this failure is in the past two governments’ inability to think of and enact long-term strategy – both on raw economic progress and security (energy and otherwise).
The culprits of this chaos are largely David Cameron, Theresa May and Boris Johnson after the financial crash, but Tony Blair and Gordon Brown’s governments must share part of the blame for not reforming or planning further when the economic conditions were sympathetic to higher investment and borrowing. It is unfair to blame the long-term decline on Sunak and Truss due to their short tenures – although Truss, especially, did not exactly help.
Liz Truss - SOP#10
While the UK has seen 4 PMs in 1834, and 3 PMs in 1827, the current level of churn of PMs and ministerial positions has never occurred when the governing party has a large majority – 70 seats. One of the most insightful takes of the year is Stephen Bush’s view that the Tory party has become structurally ungovernable – engrossed in factional battles and obsessed with political regicide. Liz Truss was a symptom of a declining governing party which is fatigued – producing few unique ideas and largely incapable (but ideologically acceptable) leaders. Truss, resultantly, was an unparalleled failure; the shortest PM in history and easily the worst. Her chaotic rule of 44 days was more akin to a medieval monarch than a modern PM.
Truss’s downfall was her ‘mini’-budget – which failed due to a mix of economic blindness and general idiocy – attempting to abolish / cut certain taxes, while funding it through a magic money tree of unfunded, high-interest rate borrowing. The markets, and most of the political system, declared war on a government deemed too dangerous to rule. After this omnishambles, Truss proceeded to fire her Chancellor Kwasi Kwarteng, which terminally weakened her. The mess of the Truss premiership then ended in what TPI now terms ‘the night of the long U-turns’ – when the entire government was engulfed in crisis and confusion, read SOP#10 for the full details.
The agent of political chaos here is easy to blame on Truss, but truly it's the system of structural ungovernability of the Tory party which is now producing unsuitable leaders because of its absolute division on what it wants to be or do as a party.
Keir Starmer - LS#2
Johnson and Truss’s fast declines were only possible with the resurgence of Labour as a powerful opposition, a threat to these scandal-ridden PMs. With Corbyn’s fruitless era over, Keir Starmer has successfully transformed Labour’s reputation with his eviction of lingering antisemitism in the party and focus on credible proposals for change. Starmer’s quietly ruthless style has arguably been their greatest strength, as Emma Burnell has outlined. We can see this in the strengthening of the front bench, emboldened with additions like Rachel Reeves as Shadow Chancellor and Wes Streeting as Shadow Health Secretary. Wider party unification could position the party for an even stronger government. The dangers of a divided governing party have been made obvious by the Conservatives this year.
While current polls are favourable to a Labour majority, 2023 could be a resurgent year for the Tories if Sunak can achieve some progress on the Northern Ireland deal, small boat immigration and economic recovery. Starmer’s biggest test will be beating the Tories when they are not self-imploding, and that is still yet to be proven. There is ample evidence he could do this with a positive message - which he started at Conference this year - but it remains an open question. Stealing Johnson’s message on levelling up would not be a bad next step, especially if Labour could tie this to their devolution strategy, as has been suggested.
Currently, a Labour majority at the next election has a 60% chance, with a hung parliament around 30% and a Tory majority around 10%. The odds are in Starmer’s favour – for now. While Starmer has contributed to chaos by his strong performances, his only real contribution will be in 2023/4 if he fails to win a majority and is forced to rule through weak coalitions.
Rishi Sunak - Boring is Back
The Tories, mortified (but somehow surprised) at what they had produced with Johnson and Truss, appointed Rishi Sunak – the UK’s first Asian Prime Minister and the third of 2022. Third time’s the charm? Sunak’s Autumn emergency budget was an act of stealth deflationary cuts, designed to calm everyone down and push politics back into the realm of the boring.
We have now, like salmon returning to their home at the end of their lives, reached full circle. 12 years on, the governing party has reached back to its ‘Sensibilism’ of Osborne style austerity – but this time the Conservatives cannot blame it on Labour or ‘the necessities’ of a financial crash. Investment and borrowing has reached a point of worrying expense due to interest rates and inflation. The UK has the highest taxes since 1945, but worsening equality, wages and productivity. Sunak has inherited the worst UK economic position since Thatcher, Callaghan or Attlee. It’s up to Sunak to tame his party and achieve progress in 2023. The early signs are promising – with a new deal on Northern Ireland progressing and a genuine interest to explore rebalancing the economy through Gove’s Levelling Up department and the upcoming Spring statement. But it all seems too little, too late.
For now, Sunak has brought orthodoxy stability rather than political tumult. This will only last if he can repair both his party and the economy - which would require a political figure equivalent to the greatest in our history.
Onwards to 2023
There are only a few key factors heading into next year to note. Most importantly, the Tory party. This factional and possibly ungovernable Conservative party could dispose of Sunak quicker than expected if the Tories remain 20% behind in the polls and the economy fails to recover. Both Andrew Marr and Katy Balls believe Sunak’s government will fall next year – with Balls insinuating that Johnson will inflict brutal revenge for his original backstab. If this happens, the political crisis will become constitutional – with King Charles forced to appoint a new Tory PM that may not be able to command confidence (de facto) in the House of Commons but won’t actually lose a formal confidence vote (de jure). A stasis of inertia as the government could barely function – like during the last days in October 2019 when Johnson failed to get an election through parliament, as the government ‘stewed in its own juices.’ Can the new King really appoint a 4th Tory prime minister who will inevitably be ousted without hurting his own reputation? There is an argument (see Lascelles principles) that gets stronger as the chaos continues: a dissolution of parliament and a new election is the easiest way to restore legitimacy in a new PM – for either the Tories or Labour.
The other key factor heading into next year is the economy – namely inflation. Expected to decline in 2023, it's possible we are about to experience a period of economic recovery. But the first half of 2023 – especially January to March, will remain tough as energy bills and food prices remain high, and the cold bites. Only when inflation (and thus interest rates) ease can consumers start fuelling the economy, and the government start to construct a new economic recovery. But can Sunak survive his Party’s regicidal tendencies and repair the economy in time for the next election? Only 2023 will tell…