The Nation in Labour Party Politics #2
Why should Labour embrace the idea of the nation?
This is the second in a two-part series on Labour and the Nation. Feel free to read part one here. Subscribe to keep up to date with our work.
Labour’s articulation of ‘nationhood’ in Starmer’s 2023 conference speech should not have been a surprise. Not only have successful past iterations of the party framed their message in national rhetoric at the least, and policy at the most, but nationhood and patriotism have been prominent concepts in party strategy since 2019. First, there is the name of what can be considered the party’s headline policy: ‘Great British Energy’. No mention of Greenery, as before with the party’s ‘Green Industrial Revolution’ in 2019 – the emphasis is decidedly on national self-interest more than internationalist climate politics. Similarly, in a much-mocked move online, Starmer has taken to giving statements in front of giant Union flags, including on the 2023 conference stage – again, a national focus, and an important dividing line with the previous leadership. Emphasising the nation in campaigning for government has long been an undercurrent in Labour under Starmer, therefore. This year’s conference only shouted from the rooftops an underlying raison d'etre for his leadership.
Much of this national rhetoric has appeared only surface level, helping Labour’s image. While part of why Labour has tacked toward patriotism, there is a more fundamental reason for a national politics: because the nation is how much of the electorate perceives security.
Labour’s Superficial Image Problem
Labour is often seen as unpatriotic, downplaying the country’s strengths. Much of this can be attributed to its attacks on the dominant party of the government's record, which naturally translates as attacking the condition of the country.
More than this, however, it is in the argument that Labour should push beyond popular opinion toward more moral policies that Labour gets its reputation. Many on the left view politics more as a place to persuade rather than a place to reflect popular opinion. This is an important function of a democratic system that seeks to avoid crude populism and engage in honest political argument. It can, however, create distance between a party’s policy platform and popular electoral desire if a party sees itself as moral leaders, particularly on issues the nation is not yet comfortable with. The decriminalisation of homosexuality and abortion in the 1960s, for example, while widely touted now as the Wilson government’s greatest achievements, were understood at the time to have contributed to a ‘silent majority’ victory for the Conservatives in 1970, illustrating the ‘anti-permissive society’. Many in the Labour movement, particularly in the membership and on the left of the party, have seen themselves in this tradition and, indeed, it is mainstream party opinion on these social issues. This distance between ‘moral leadership’ of the Labour Party’s state and the nation’s views can create a strategic problem for the party: the large division has consistently hurt Labour’s performance among swing voters, especially with socially authoritarian values, and weakened their claim as a natural party of government.
Additionally, this line of ‘persuasion’ thinking, at its worst, can convince the party the electorate already agree, that a final push of ‘back-to-principles socialism’ will lead to inevitable victory – the result of over-confident historical determinism, the idea the left is on the ‘right side of history’. Usually this puts the party membership and the left in conflict with the more pragmatic leadership, though there have been exceptions: famously, Jeremy Corbyn ‘won the argument’ despite 2019 electoral defeat. But this has a long history, with many in the party convinced victory would soon come after defeat in the 1950s and 1970s. The distance between these espoused principles and view of the electorate/nation, therefore, creates an impression of being a party of protest, so concerned with ideological policy they have become unconcerned with the electorate’s views.
Seeking to arrest these themes is certainly part of Starmer’s messaging, as it has been for other leaderships: his response to being glitter-bombed at the start of his leader’s speech was to recall how far he has transformed the party away from the politics of protest. ‘Never again’ he cried to conference. Being a competent, trustworthy alternative to the Conservatives is vital, the party too often perceived as a threat – especially to the nation in pursuit of expensive socialist objectives, most recently in 2019 but also back to 1992, 1983 and beyond. The right of the party, and they’re broadly correct, has long viewed this as irresponsible and putting party doctrine over nation as a threat to progressive politics: locking Labour out of power and allowing the social democratic elements of Britain to be attacked by endless Tory governments. More than anything, however, being seen as responsible for government is a prerequisite for winning an election, not an appeal in itself – the Conservatives are so rarely viewed as dangerous that Labour using patriotism to seem responsible does little to change the dial on its own
The image problem is an important factor, then, espousing patriotism being part of a solution to escaping the ‘party of protest’ perceptions. But it isn’t an explanation in itself. Rather, it is the surface of a deeper phenomenon. A party engaged with nationhood and patriotism is a party engaged with the electorate as a whole.
The Deep Roots of Nationhood
The nation is what the electorate views politics through. A strong part of this fundamental truth is the desire for security – and the nation-state is the provider from both economic and national threats, as well as the freedom of opportunity this security provides. As TPI has said before:
“ Since 1945, government intervention has been key in helping or destroying lives, and even in a world of globalisation the nation-state is still the UK voters’ most trusted and accessible lifeline… Voters look to the nation – which is why it remains pivotal in the political and cultural realm.”
To view the nation-state as the provider of security in health, employment and a basic standard of living is a relatively new thing. It is also the best expression of progressive nationalism, a nationalism that is inclusionary, and works to provide a secure future and living standard for its citizens, rather than simply espousing discriminatory rhetoric. Nations are communities that believe they will benefit from cooperation, historically on national security, but as the state has grown larger, particularly over the twentieth century, the nation has become the vehicle through which socio-economic security, too, is provided. I’m talking about the welfare state, from the New Liberal Edwardian government to the interwar Conservative administrations and through to the postwar reforming Labour government and the NHS. I’m talking about full employment and greater trade union power in the postwar period and the way this was conceptualised as providing job security and a stable economy. The twentieth century saw a huge expansion of the nation-state’s remit, much of which focused on providing socioeconomic security for citizens.
And that, today, is vitally important to the electorate. As Brexit and the Johnson-Sunak Conservative governments have shown, national politics is fundamental to the reaction of those ‘left behind’ by the small-state politics of freedom from 1980-2008. Thatcher’s wave of ‘freedom’ came at the cost of economic and social security – no longer would full employment be maintained or workers rights be prioritised over business competition. Instead, people were expected to flow between jobs in an ‘agile’, globalised economy. Now, as politics swings away from the positivity on globalisation and towards the nation-state, achieving security through an enlarged state is back on the menu. Fundamentally, Johnson’s national populism appealed to voters in favour of greater state investment – whether that be levelling-up in the North or £350m sent to the EU being put into the NHS.
Consequently, Starmer has emphasised the politics of place, that young people should believe they can get a job in the area they grew up in and on bringing industry back to Britain in the form of renewable energy. Renewable energy that he says will increase energy security from threats foreign (Putin’s Russia) and domestic (high energy bills and inflation) – the same argument Sunak makes on oil and gas licences in the North Sea. These are rejections of globalised, neoliberal politics of the 1980s, 1990s and 2000s that saw oil and gas pumped from Russia and London’s financial growth prioritised above all else, and represent an important part of the ‘national renewal’ vision. Security is a dominant force in politics – and voters see security, whether economic, national or energy, through the nation. Labour can, and is, tapping into this, whether through its energy policy or its ‘securonomics’ message.
As covered in part one, Labour has frequently had a national message – and this has usually been aligned with a strong desire for expanding security through the nation-state. Notably, this includes governments Starmer has consciously evoked as examples of Labour’s power in government. Attlee’s Labour nationalised health and furthered house building while universalising public services – all to provide security from the ‘Five Ills of the Beveridge Report (Want, Disease, Ignorance, Squalor and Sickness). Full employment and food/energy security were key to their economic productivity and national security successes, as was the security of a roof over everyone’s head through their massive house-building programme. Similarly, in pursuit of anti-terrorism measures, Blair ramped up authoritarian measures to terror threats, mindful of the nation’s ultimate desire for security, even at the cost of the individual liberties so many think of as inherently British. After the 2005 7/7 attacks, prominent in the government’s anti-terrorism strategy was social and education policy, aiming at the prevention of radicalisation. Significantly, these were moments of great insecurity for the electorate, and the strength of the nation, expressed in the state, was a lifeline against these external shocks. It will be for whatever comes next, too.
Conclusion
Iterations of the Labour Party that advocate nation-based politics and emphasise their patriotism, then, have often had a more accurate sense of the electorate’s nature, and will, more often than not, shape Labour’s message to popular desire rather than moral persuasion. Importantly, this tends to be when the electorate desires security through the state – or the nation.
The nation-state and associated patriotism, therefore, is important to progressive electoral and government success. It is a realm that many on the left are queasy about, associating it with toxic nationalism and an absence of class politics. But there is a long history of progressive nationalism, as seen in part one of this series, and it is one the Labour Party should reclaim in pursuit of better government and a more socialist Britain.
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This two-part series is the sketches of a larger, more formal study on the Nation and Labour.
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