Wargaming 2024 #3: 40 days out
Updates and predictions for GE2024
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The 2024 general election is on. This series has given two timely snapshots roughly six months apart in April 2023 and October 2023. Our argument throughout has been consistent: Sunak needs a healthy economy and strong delivery on his basic pledges to stand any chance of winning the election. For Labour to lose, Starmer would need to slip up heavily, while the structural issues (such as FPTP) would need to limit Labour significantly. So, where are we at 40 days out?
Polling Data
To begin, as always, here is an updated amalgamation of the most popular election models, of varying methods and debatable accuracy (Last taken from live / most recent models 27/05/24):
As seen above, the models have shifted further towards a Labour landslide — however with increasing variance in their predictions. Meanwhile, horse race polling has Labour at an almost universal 20-point lead, with the FT poll tracker below a good example. In fact Sunak’s polling is just as bad as Liz Truss’ was when she left office. The other substantive change in recent months is Reform’s surge into third place – whether this continues in the campaign or becomes squeezed by the Tory vote is an open question. Expect some squeezing though not enough to propel the Tories anything beyond the low 30s.
On the golden metrics which usually decide elections, (who will be the best prime minister and economic competency) Starmer enters the campaign in a commanding position.
Economic competency (YouGov):
All the while Ipsos, the best pollster for leader approval ratings, has shown a marked decrease for Sunak:
So it's safe to say the polling metrics overwhelmingly point to a Labour victory. But as we know polls can change and they can also be dramatically wrong – 2017 is a great example. Matching the polls with the fundamentals will give us a clearer picture.
The Fundamentals
The October 2023 Wargaming illustrated an improving picture on the economy, with inflation down, wages growing and economic growth up. For this May edition, the picture has been slightly more mixed. Inflation is down to 2.3% which is great for Sunak, but without deflation or significant wage increases living standards will not return to levels prior to 2019. Wages have been growing but will need to do so above inflation for a far more consistent period to make a meaningful difference. Additionally, interest rate cuts have not materialised, with the Bank of England holding rates at 5.25% for longer.
Economic growth has been a bit of a mess. The UK actually entered a recession after two successive contractions in Q3 and Q4 of 2023. It exited the recession in Q1 with the fastest growth (0.6) in the G7, with levels of expansion not seen since the rebound from Covid –  though this is somewhat to be expected after a recession. But overall the picture of economic growth has been unsatisfactory, the economy hit by, and failing to recover from the financial crash, eurozone crisis, as well as Brexit, and the Covid / Inflation impacts. While it's been difficult for the government to deal with external shocks, there have been a series of conscious economic policy choices which have harmed the UK, and with living standards declining for the first ever modern parliament, the voters will (unsurprisingly) be blaming the incumbent government.
Matched with the wider fundamentals: fourteen-year ageing government, questionable performance on delivery, struggling public services and political churn, it becomes a very tough battle for Sunak to win even if the economy is slowly recovering.
New Developments
We’ve previously analysed how our electoral system (FPTP) is slowly becoming fairer for Labour. James Kanagasooriam, held by many insiders as the go-to election guru, has published a timely piece suggesting Labour’s popular lead vote could be as low as 4% to win a majority.Â
It is a remarkable change from the 12% lead needed in 2019, and one many in the media are yet to catch up on. The new 4% gap effectively minimises the chance of a Sunak comeback with a rally in the Tory vote unlikely to deny a Labour majority, even if it could reduce it. Kanagasooriam offers four compelling points as to why Labour are performing better under FPTP:
1. .Labour maintaining a decent vote share for suburban voters, non-graduates and C2 voters (see Ipsos data here). These voters are distributed very advantageously in historically marginal seats. Also critical is a constrained age curve (Gordon Brown won 31% of over 65s vs 17% in Jeremy Corbyn’s 2019 outing).
2 Inroads in Scotland — specifically the block of Central Belt seats Labour held — effectively lowered Labour’s required vote gap by 2–4 points.3 Liberal Democrats taking 30–40 seats off the Conservatives in seats that were otherwise demographically-Conservative raised the bar for Conservatives to govern by another 2–4 points.
4 Tactical voting, and whether parties of the centre-left disliked the Conservatives more than they disliked each other.
However, a further caveat is that the new boundaries on which the election will be fought benefit the Conservatives. Curtice suggests if the results of 2019 were replayed on the new boundaries the Tories would gain about seven seats, with Johnson’s majority reaching 94, rather than 80. If Labour and the Tories had the same vote share of 38%, the Tories would be 50 seats ahead due to the boundary advantages, whereas previously they only had a natural advantage of 23. But it is unknown how exactly new boundaries will interact with current voter coalitions (who make up each party's vote). It's possible that any Tory advantage becomes insignificant compared to the scale of Labour leads and new (efficient) voter groups they are targeting.
The other development is the evidence of the local elections. It was yet another disastrous night for the Conservatives, who lost almost 500 further seats and 10 councils, while falling to third behind the Liberal Democrats. The progressive parties picked up the seats quite evenly, with Labour making the most gains and defeating Andy Street in the electorally important mayoral seat of the West Midlands. The only parliamentary seat up for election – Blackpool South – swung to Labour on a mammoth 26%. The results continued the trend of the disintegration of the Tory vote. The fact that it occurred only three weeks ago adds to their electoral Mount Everest and the small timescale Sunak has to climb it. The elections were also a clear demonstration of increased tactical voting – possibly the most the UK electoral system has ever experienced. Overall, it was a terrible omen for the Conservatives.
As a team we debated whether we should add a prediction of how likely it was Labour would win a Landslide. We decided not to be sensitive, not to pre-empt the trends too much. But this seems rather foolish now. So, to make amends we’ll do two landslide predictions: one now at the start of the campaign, and one at the end of the campaign. Our simple definition of a Landslide is a three-figure majority. TPI’s base prediction is that there is a somewhat likely chance of a Labour landslide, in the region of 60%, but this is a tricky prediction to make before we see the campaign. Landslides can become much less likely over a campaign due to poll tightening and the random events of the final week / election day and night. However, if the Conservatives continue their troubled start to the campaign, it could become more likely.
The New Prediction
As a result of our rolling analysis over 12 months, our TPI (non-quantitative) predictions are as follows:
– 85% chance of Labour majority (+5)
– 10% chance of Labour minority (-5)
– 4% chance of Conservative minority (n/c)Â
– 1% chance of Conservative majority (n/c)
Five weeks Time…
This series has produced three equidistant snapshots of the electoral fundamentals and developments leading into the 2024 general election. As you have tracked our thinking and methodology throughout, we hope you’ve got a clearer picture of how many inside politics think about elections, and what metrics they use.
While our predictions are subjective straws in the wind, we feel it's only right to be honest with readers about how we think the country will vote. In doing this it allows readers to judge us on what we got right, and what we got wrong. Over the campaign
Tom Egerton is a political writer and researcher, his upcoming book ‘The Conservative Effect 2010-24: 14 Wasted Years?’ is out on 27 June 2024, published by CUP and co-edited with Anthony Seldon. Follow him on X / Twitter here.