Wargaming 2024 #1: 12 Months Out
12 months out, what is the likely result of the 2024 General Election?
NB 24/05/2024: When we first wrote this series we assumed, like many, that the election date would be around October / November 2024. Seeing as Sunak has called a snap election, we’ve changed the dates of the title / in text references so they work as a legacy piece. All the text that isn’t time related has remained the same.
It is roughly 12 months until the next general election. The long campaigns have begun: evident in the duel of the January speeches and recent attack ads. But beyond the bluster of Westminster, few coherent arguments have been made for where we are actually going in 2024. This series will examine some different scenarios of the 2024 result, and its possible aftermath.
This series will track the polling and vote until election day. The key questions and narratives that 2024 will be decided by are already observable, if not solidified yet. So, any far-out argument of a particular result must be bold, and must identify the core fundamentals of politics, while also allowing space for time and events to play its part.
A good night for who?
It is election night at 9:55pm. The Political Inquiry is at the Labour election night party somewhere in Westminster. It’s 5 minutes before the exit poll is released, and a sense of nervousness permeates the surroundings. Keir Starmer and Rishi Sunak both already know the result – released to leaders before officially published at 10:00pm.
As Big Ben strikes 10, what does it read?
The most popular election models, of varying methods and debatable accuracy, would have you believe a Labour landslide is the likeliest outcome (Last taken from live models 24/04/23):1
Are we really about to see a landslide akin to Tony Blair’s famous 1997 victory? Another new dawn has broken? Well, not yet. If this was the definite eventuality there would be no point writing this series. Even in 1997 it was not exactly clear a landslide would occur, nor did the party act like it. Philip Gould’s Unfinished Revolution, Alastair Campbell’s diaries, Anthony Seldon’s Blair books or Andrew Rawnsley’s Servants of the People can all attest to that.
Any consideration of the 2024 results thus needs caution. TPI has written numerous times how narratives can create a blinding form of groupthink on the Westminster bubble – leading to an ignorance of the ‘lesser’ likelihoods of events. Westminster's deficiency in understanding what probability means – just look at Boris Johnson – is arguably why their predictions and narratives become stagnant or incorrect. In real terms, if TPI had to nail our predictions to a mast 12 months out, they would be:
– 70% chance of a Labour Majority
– 20% chance of Labour being the largest party (no majority)
– 8% chance of Conservative’s being the largest party (no majority)
– 2% chance of a Conservative Majority
Before exploring why a Labour majority might not happen, it’s best to explain why our base prediction is a Labour majority: whether big, small or normal. There are three primary reasons to predict this.
Firstly, the fundamentals are stacked against the Tories. Being in government for 14 years, taking serious reputational hits on the economy (Truss, growth or austerity), burning through leaders to the point of political chaos (5 PMs in 6 years) and, overall, a difficult domestic picture (NHS waiting lists, crime, immigration).
Secondly, the current polling places the Tories between 10-20% behind Labour, mostly losing on all key election-predicting metrics like ‘best PM’ or ‘most trusted to run the economy’ – even with Sunak closing the gap. It is certainly compelling when the fundamentals match with the polling, although this can lull political insiders into a false sense of security, so do not switch off – the two can still diverge within 18 months.
The third reason a labour majority is likely is due to the possibility of political-economy cycle change: which has happened, but has not fed fully into the electoral system. Many understand the feelings that Vote Leave unlocked in 2016, and when in No.10 in 2019, but none since have built a narrative or operation to utilise it. If we are seeing a political correction in the electorate (and elite), produced from the underlying cycle / attitude shifts, then 2024 is likely a Labour victory. There is ample evidence and polling, see Will Jennings or the British General Election of 2019 (Ford et al, 2021), of the population shifting left on economics (but importantly NOT on all social issues).
There is no need to explore the exact manifestation of this new consensus, but simply to guide you to a piece we wrote here. In short, the state will remain / become bigger but in a more advanced and targeted way compared to eras like the post-war consensus of mass-nationalisation. Devolution and localism will be key (acting as a new form of the state, while also a lock on it), as will the neoliberal lessons of utilising the markets for progress and growth.
Reduced to a phrase: ‘social capitalism’ or ‘neo radicalism’ but both are opaque and quite useless. Reduced to a feeling: ‘Control’ or ‘Security’ against the wider impacts of economic downturn, inequality, ‘out-of-touch’ elites, and globalisation. The point is neither campaign has (yet) fully grasped a possible shift to a new consensus. If that consensus is powerful enough to breakthrough regardless of campaign or candidate in 2024, then Labour will be the first to benefit. This is because Labour should easily own the ‘change’ party status being out of government for 14 years, and the consensus shift will be towards a bigger state – a mantle they own by default, though not necessarily by merit.
If you were to filter out the complexities of those three reasons above, there is one metric that links them all, and will swing the election: the economy. With the Trussite explosion damaging the market, the current mini-banking crisis, seemingly sticky inflation, real-wage cuts continuing for over a decade, nonexistent growth and the weak structure of the UK economy (services, open to international pressures) – the chances of stark economic recovery in the next 12months seems negligible. This is before you even look at the OBR, BoE, OECD or IMF estimates… which are dire for any return to a prosperous, election-winning, economy. Perhaps this will change for future posts in this series.
What's the big idea?
Ok, TPI, if you’re so sure of a Labour majority, then why are you writing about the very possibility of that not happening? Because things change. Understanding why and how they will change is important. A reason why our political system, and successive governments, have failed is their ignorance of long-term political strategy and delivery. Ruling the present may give a quick hit of dopamine, but the future is a much more powerful and difficult beast to master.
Is there really a 30% probability that Labour do not get a majority? Yes. As stated in many TPI pieces, a certain amount of power is predetermined by the deeper forces in politics – shifts in underlying cycles or circumstance. If you are Sunak, you have had a large chunk of your political hand dealt to you. It’s up to him to do what he can with the cards he has left – there are surely no aces, especially with his reduced political capital due to a divided party and no personal mandate. But sometimes, the ‘superficial’ surface of politics of luck, people, time and events can change a lot.
Beginning with systemic luck: Labour are inherently at a disadvantage in the FPTP (First past the post) electoral system we have. Essentially, Labour’s vote is what politicos call ‘inefficient’ – literally meaning it's clumped up in city or university seats where most of their big votes are ‘wasted’ as they only count in one such constituency. As many, particularly Ben Walker, has noted, Labour will therefore need a much larger lead in the raw vote (roughly 8%) to win an overall majority in order to counterbalance their wasted votes in big majority seats. Peter Kellner is even more pessimistic, believing Labour will need a 10%+ lead.
On a good night, if Labour’s votes spread evenly as they hope – a sign of a strong campaign strategy – then a Labour majority is a given. On a bad night, Labour trickling a few percentage points back, say from a 8% lead in the polls to a 6-5% lead on the night, could likely result in a hung parliament because of the current inefficiency of their vote. In contrast, the Conservatives, especially with new boundary changes, could win a majority with just a 4-5% lead. The recent revelations about the SNP and Sturgeon’s resignation may prove the inefficiency argument wrong – with the possibility of Scottish seats proving easy ‘efficient’ wins, and likely a large contributing factor to a Labour majority in 2024 (as TPI and Rob Ford have contended).
But but but… the Conservatives being the largest party or a majority at a combined 10%, really? This is a hedge – but not a wild one. It is sensible to make considering three factors:
People: Rishi Sunak’s good performance – foreshadowed in TPI pieces and now an addiction for the right in the Westminster bubble. A series of successes, whether in Northern Ireland, establishing his prime ministerial tone or stabilising the economy, has given the party hope. Setting immigration, NHS waiting lists and crime targets, while beneficial for Conservative voter targeting, could backfire heavily if not improved in 12 months time. Economic growth, as mentioned before, supersedes all. A few quarters of healthy growth, and large decreases in inflation before the election could bring Sunak back into play as the ‘moving in the right direction but don’t mess it up with Labour’ candidate. There are 4 economic quarters before the election – with polling day all but confirmed after Q3 next year – which could provide enough time for the economy to recover. The timing of the election also means any significant growth data for Q3 will drop in the middle of the election campaign and could be vital for Sunak’s ‘recover the economy’ narrative.
Time, events and luck – a key element of surface politics. 12 months is a long time. Anything can happen, and if that adds a 2-4% onto the Tory vote and off the Labour vote, whether a rally to the flag event or otherwise, then a hung parliament comes into play. A comeback is unlikely, but not impossible. Another wait and see caveat.
Finally, institutional groupthink. Quantitative polling (especially MRPs) are usually quite inaccurate this far out from elections – see Owen Winter. Election expert James Kanagasooriam have written in detail about this too, arguing the hyperbolic state of some polling methods and metrics could allow for Tory recovery. The Liberal Democrats foolishly followed incorrect polling in the summer of 2019, thinking they could win 80 seats and some even believing they could form the next government. If there is a non-minimal polling error or a general over-exaggeration of Labour’s numbers then the Conservatives are still in the fight to recover ground and force a hung parliament. SW1 has mostly decided the Tories have lost, leaving a gap for a submarine recovery, or for Labour to build a strategy on incorrect polling numbers. Dominic Cummings’ recent piece on US and UK polling raises the point that polling is still underinvested in and inaccurate.
As discussed in a recent TPI podcast, there is more likely to be a Corbyn style recovery forcing a hung parliament (28% combined probability on our prediction) rather than an outright shock Tory majority akin to Major in 1992, currently a 2% likelihood.
In 6 Months Time…
It's now time to cryogenically freeze these predictions and pick them up in 6 months time. Much may have changed, but it’s unlikely the fundamentals will have changed enough to trigger a complete reversal in predictions.
State of The Nations (NewStatesman): 373 Lab, Con 184, 22 LD, SNP 43
Electoral Calculus: 457 Lab, Con 113, SNP 36, LD 20
Election Maps Nowcast: 408 Lab, Con 157, SNP 31, LD 30
UK Polling Report’s 342 Lab, Con 212, SNP 47, LD 26
Lean Tossup 373 Lab,165 Con, SNP 51, LD 31
Really enjoyed reading this, great piece!